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Episodic Memory and Autonoetic Consciousness in Autistic Spectrum
Disorders: The roles of self-awareness, representational abilities and
temporal cognition
SOPHIE LIND and DERMOT BOWLER
Introduction
According to Schacter and Tulving (1994), human memory is subserved by a number of 
mind-brain systems including the episodic and semantic systems (see Gardiner, Chapter 
1). The episodic system encodes and retrieves personally experienced event memories, 
which consist of complex collections of features including spatial, temporal and 
contextual information. Conversely, the semantic system is largely responsible for factual 
memory and general knowledge. These memories are not generally associated with 
spatial, temporal or contextual information. Crucially, retrieval from each system is 
associated with a distinct form of conscious awareness: episodic retrieval – or 
‘remembering’ – involves autonoetic (self-knowing) consciousness, whereas semantic
retrieval – or ‘knowing’ – involves noetic consciousness. Thus, semantic retrieval might 
involve, for example, bringing a known fact to mind, whereas episodic retrieval might 
involve remembering the particular episode during which that fact was learned.  The 
episodic system underlies the capacity for ‘mental time travel’ (Suddendorf & Corballis, 
1997; Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997) – either mentally projecting oneself into the past 
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to re-experience an event or mentally “projecting oneself into the future to pre-
experience [italics added] an event” (Atance & O’Neill, 2005, p.127).
Individuals with an autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) generally perform well on
tasks that require semantic (or other) memory processes, but perform poorly on tasks that 
demand the support of the episodic system (see Chapters 12, 14, and 17; also Bennetto, 
Pennington, & Rogers, 1996; Minshew & Goldstein, 2001; Ben Shalom, 2003). This 
chapter aims to establish the reasons for this impairment in episodic remembering. The 
main thrust of our argument is to suggest that autonoetic consciousness is attenuated in 
people with an ASD. Before considering possible explanations, however, the 
prerequisites for the development of episodic memory (EM) in typical individuals will be 
considered.  These prerequisites will be used as a framework for exploring the causes of 
the EM impairment in autism.  
Prerequisites of Episodic Memory in Typical Development
In typical development, EM is not fully functional until at least 4;0 years of age.  
Although infants, toddlers, and young preschoolers show impressive memory retention,
such achievements are likely to be manifestations of other memory systems (Cowan,
1997). The relatively late emergence of EM is likely to be due to the fact that young
children cannot yet experience autonoetic consciousness. Wheeler et al. (1997) define
autonoetic consciousness as the ability to mentally represent and become aware of
subjective experiences in the past, present and future. It enables the kind of mental time
travel that characterises episodic remembering. This form of consciousness is thought to 
This chapter is published in a revised form in J. Boucher & D. Bowler (Eds.). Memory in Autism: 
Theory and Evidence.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. © J. Boucher & D. Bowler 2008.
4
depend upon a number of interrelated cognitive abilities including having a concept of 
self, representational abilities that include a capacity for metarepresentation, and certain 
achievements in the domain of temporal cognition. Until each of these elements is in 
place children cannot become autonoetically conscious. We will begin our discussion by 
considering the typical developmental paths of these three likely prerequisites.
1. Development of the Self
The intuitive assumption that we each possess some kind of unitary core self – something 
akin to a soul – has given way, in psychology at least, to theories proposing various 
delineations of the self. For example, the most widely accepted distinction is between the 
self as the subject of experience – the ‘I’ – and the self as the object of experience – the 
‘me’ (James, 1890). However, Neisser (1988) has developed a more elaborate taxonomy 
claiming that there are five forms of self-awareness: ecological, interpersonal, 
conceptual, private, and temporally extended self-awareness. Ecological and 
interpersonal self-awareness are perceptually based and early developing, together
constituting implicit self-awareness (corresponding to James’ notion of the ‘I’). The
former entails awareness of the body in relation to the physical environment, whereas the 
latter entails awareness of the self in relation to others in the social environment.  
Conceptual, private and temporally extended self-awareness are later maturing and
representationally based, underpinning explicit self-awareness (the ‘me’). Conceptual
self-awareness occurs when the self becomes the object rather than merely the subject of 
thought. It entails having a concept of ‘me’ comprising of a set of beliefs about the self. 
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Private self-awareness refers to explicit, conceptual awareness of aspects of the self not 
accessible to others (e.g., awareness of internal mental states). Finally, temporally 
extended self-awareness is also conceptual but involves an additional temporal 
dimension, thereby endowing individuals with a sense of continuity in personal identity 
through time. These various types of self-awareness are likely to be
interrelated/interdependent in that, for example, implicit forms of self-awareness serve as 
a foundation for explicit self-awareness. Nevertheless, each of these dimensions follows 
its own ontogenetic trajectory evolving throughout development particularly during early 
childhood, as outlined next.  
Implicit self-awareness: the ecological and interpersonal selves
A considerable amount of evidence suggests that infants are endowed with rudimentary
ecological and interpersonal self-awareness soon after birth (Rochat, 1995). For instance, 
24-hour-old neonates show significantly more rooting responses (orienting towards 
perioral cheek stimulation) when they receive external stimulation from an
experimenter’s hand than when they are ‘self-stimulated’ by the experimenter moving the 
infant’s own hand to their cheek (Rochat & Hespos, 1997). Such selective responsiveness 
demonstrates self/non-self discrimination and, therefore, a degree of ecological self-
awareness. That newborns will learn to suck on a pacifier at a specific rate in order to see 
or hear a pleasant stimulus such as a picture or their mother’s voice (e.g., Siqueland & 
DeLucia, 1969; DeCasper & Fifer, 1980), shows that they can also exert intentional 
control over their behaviour, revealing that they have a sense of ‘agency’ – a critical 
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hallmark of the ecological self (Neisser, 1995; Gibson, 1995).  Agency involves 
implicitly distinguishing between self-caused and environmentally caused changes in 
perceptual experience. It involves perceiving oneself as the centre of control of one’s own 
action-generated experiences and recognising one’s responsibility for particular changes 
in perceptual experience (Russell, 1996). Interpersonal self-awareness is clearly evident 
among 2-month-olds. Infants of this age readily engage in ‘protoconversations’ with their 
caregivers (Murray & Trevarthen, 1985) – mutually regulated, coordinated interactions 
involving turn-taking and imitation of vocal, facial, and gestural expressions (Trevarthen 
& Aitken, 2001) – that show clear awareness of the self in relation to another. That babies 
exert intentional control in these social exchanges indicates a clear sense of agency in the 
interpersonal domain also.  
Explicit self-awareness: the conceptual, private and temporally extended selves.
Conceptual self-awareness. Only in the second year of life do children become
reflexively – conceptually – self-aware. A number of concurrent developments, including 
the emergence of self-conscious emotions, personal pronoun use, and a set of explicit 
beliefs about the self, are considered to be expressions of conceptual self-awareness.  
However, mirror self-recognition (MSR) is widely regarded as the litmus test of 
conceptual self-awareness.  
In the classic form of the MSR paradigm (Amsterdam, 1972), a familiar adult
surreptitiously marks the child’s face with brightly-coloured pigment under the pretence
of wiping their face clean. The experimenter then assesses the child’s response to their
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reflection. Touching the mark is generally thought to indicate the presence of a self-
concept and indeed it would appear to imply at least a basic conceptual knowledge of
one’s typical facial appearance (but see Mitchell, 1993, 1997; Loveland, 1986, 1993; and 
Hobson, 1990, for alternative explanations). Studies reliably show the mean age of
success in this task to be 18 months (Anderson, 1983; Courage, Edison & Howe, 2004;
Lewis & Ramsey, 2004). Blushing, shy smiling, gaze aversion, and preening are taken to 
be expressions of embarrassment and pride, both of which are examples of self-conscious
emotions. Even the earliest studies of MSR noted these reactions among 21- to 24-month-
olds when they were confronted with their reflections (Amsterdam, 1972).  Unlike earlier 
emerging basic emotions, such as fear and joy, self-conscious emotions involve cognitive 
support and necessarily involve a self-concept, since they are emotions about the self 
(Lewis, Sullivan, Stanger, & Weiss, 1989; Lewis, 1994; Tracy & Robins, 2004). They 
involve self-evaluative processes whereby one’s representation of self is compared to a 
socially defined standard. Thus, in the case of pride, one has exceeded accepted standards 
and in the case of embarrassment, one has violated those standards.
The use of personal pronouns to refer to the self is the least controversial marker
of conceptual self-awareness. For example, using the terms ‘my’ and ‘mine’ to denote
ownership implies a concept of self. Moreover, appropriate use of the terms ‘me’ and
‘you’ signifies a sophisticated explicit differentiation of self and other, suggesting that the 
child represents self and other as distinct individuals. Only individuals who make such an 
explicit distinction can use the terms correctly because, unlike proper names, their 
meanings shift according to who is speaking – the speaker is always ‘I’ or ‘me’ and the 
listener is always ‘you’ (Bates, 1990). For example, if a parent and child were to look 
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into a mirror together, the parent would say “that’s you” whilst pointing to the child’s 
reflection, not “that’s me”, and yet by 22 to 24 months toddlers can correctly label their
own mirror image as “me” (Lewis & Ramsey, 2004; Courage, Edison, & Howe, 2004). 
Thus, when toddlers begin using these terms, one can confidently infer that they have a 
self-concept to which they are referring.  
Overall, the available evidence suggests that explicit self-awareness in the form of 
the conceptual self is first apparent in typically developing children between 15 and 24 
months. However, the conceptual self undergoes considerable elaboration over time.  Its 
development involves the gradual acquisition of a set of beliefs about the self, knowledge 
of personal characteristics, features and traits (e.g., Neisser, 1997). In its earliest stages, 
the self-concept consists mainly of beliefs about physical traits and abilities (e.g., “I have 
brown hair”; “I can skip”), only later extending to psychological and social traits (e.g., 
“I’m shy”; “I have lots of friends”) (Damon & Hart, 1988). Thus, ecologically grounded 
elements of conceptual self-awareness are earlier to develop than interpersonally 
grounded elements.
The private self. Private self-awareness emerges somewhat later than basic conceptual
self-awareness. It involves conceptual awareness of private experiences – of one’s own
mental life. It thus relies on ‘theory of mind’ (ToM), which is defined as the conceptual
system that underlies the ability to impute mental states to self or other (Perner, 2000).
Children come to appreciate mental states such as desires, intentions and beliefs between 
the ages of about 3;0 to 5;0 years, and their ability to attribute these states to self and 
other appears to develop in parallel (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1994). Thus, the development of 
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a ToM endows the child with the kind of introspective self-knowledge that characterises 
private self-awareness, allowing them to go beyond simply having private experiences to 
include the additional awareness that they have them.  
The temporally-extended self. Temporally extended self-awareness also emerges at
around 4;0 years. It involves awareness of the relations between present, past and future 
states of self. It is essentially awareness of one’s place in, and continued existence 
through, time and appears to depend upon the capacity for autonoetic consciousness 
(Moore & Lemmon, 2001). Povinelli, Landau, and Perilloux (1996), developed a task to 
investigate the development of this form of self-awareness. They introduced a temporal 
component into the traditional MSR test to create the delayed self-recognition (DSR) 
paradigm. Experimenter and child were filmed playing a game in which the child was 
praised by patting them on the head. Whilst praising the child, the experimenter covertly 
placed a large sticker on top of their head. After a delay of three minutes, the pair 
watched the recording and the child’s response was assessed.  The test is designed to 
establish whether the child understands the causal relation between this ‘past self’ 
represented on the television screen and the ‘present self’ who is watching the recording. 
Reaching for the sticker is taken as evidence for a temporally extended concept of self 
(but, for alternative explanations, see Zelazo, Sommerville & Nichols, 1999; and 
Suddendorf, 1999). Most 4;0 year olds, but few 3;0 year olds, can locate the sticker on 
their head (Povinelli, Landau, & Perilloux, 1996; Povinelli & Simon, 1998; Suddendorf, 
1999; Zelazo, Sommerville, & Nichols, 1999; Lemmon & Moore, 2001).
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The role of self-awareness in episodic memory development
We will now address the question of how these developments in self-awareness relate to
the emergence of EM. A number of researchers have argued for a causal link between
self-awareness and EM, agreeing that explicit self-awareness must be involved, since
autonoetic awareness necessitates directing attention onto a mental representation of the
self. However, there is controversy over the level of explicit self-awareness required.   
Howe and Courage (1993) have claimed that the emergence of conceptual self-
awareness, as indexed by MSR, is the critical developmental precursor for remembering
personally experienced events. However, it can be argued that the MSR task does not
capture the kind of self-awareness involved in autonoetic remembering.  
Wheeler et al. (1997, p.335) suggest that “autonoetic consciousness affords
individuals the possibility to apprehend their subjective experiences throughout time and 
perceive the present moment as both a continuation of their past and a prelude to their 
future”. Firstly, the ability to ‘apprehend subjective experiences’ seems to imply private 
self-awareness, since it involves focussing attention directly on private experiences. The 
quote also focuses on the temporality of autonoetic consciousness.  This is also 
highlighted in a second quote in which it is argued that episodic retrieval involves the 
understanding that “the self doing the [re] experiencing now is the same self that did it 
originally” (Wheeler et al., 1997, p.349). This seems to require a concept of self that is 
extended in time and is represented as such. Thus, autonoetic awareness would seem to 
involve elements of both private and temporally extended self-awareness.  It does not 
seem likely that these high level forms of self-awareness are necessary for MSR.  
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Evidence that EM depends upon private self-awareness is provided by studies
showing relationships between performance on ToM tasks and EM tasks (Naito, 2003;
Perner, Kloo, & Gornick, in press). For example, Perner and Ruffman (1995) found a
correlation between free recall, which is thought to rely primarily on the episodic system, 
and ToM tests measuring understanding of own knowledge states. The likely role of 
temporally extended self-awareness is supported by studies showing relationships 
between DSR and EM. Welch-Ross (2001) found that children who demonstrated DSR 
showed significantly greater episodic recall in mother-child conversations about past 
events than children who did not show DSR. Similarly, Lemmon and Moore (2001) 
found a significant correlation between DSR and an EM measure, which involved 
remembering the temporal order of events in a sticker finding game.
2. The Development of Representational Abilities
We turn now to the second of the likely developmental prerequisites of EM. Changes in
representational abilities are relevant not only in terms of their direct role in the
development of autonoetic consciousness and EM but also in terms of the developments
in self-awareness that were described above. According to Perner’s (1991)
representational theory of mind, prior to 18 months of age infants are limited to primary
representations which faithfully model the currently perceived state of affairs.  
Representational skills post 18 months, however, reach a new level of sophistication,
with an emerging capacity for secondary representation which allows the child to hold in 
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mind multiple, even contradictory, representations of the world which can be
differentiated from and compared to a primary representation of reality.  
It has been suggested that conceptual self-awareness relies upon this capacity for 
secondary representation (Perner, 1991; Suddendorf & Whiten, 2001; Asendorpf,
Warkentin, & Baudonnière, 1996). Thus, in the case of mirror self-recognition, the 18-
month-old is able to hold in mind a stable representation of their typical facial appearance 
(no mark) and compare it to a veridical, primary representation of their currently 
perceived reflected image (marked). The infant must recognise the discrepancy between 
these two representations and use this information to initiate appropriate behaviour – i.e., 
trying to remove the mark. Prior to the transition from primary to secondary 
representation, perceptions of self are in a state of constant flux, and self-representations 
are largely online. At this stage, stable characteristics cannot be attributed to the self and, 
therefore, there can be no enduring concept of self. Primary representations, although 
sufficient for ecological and interpersonal self-awareness, are not adequate for conceptual 
self-awareness.  
Developments in representational skill also directly affect the capacity for
autonoetic awareness. Autonoetic awareness involves focussing attention on one’s own
mental states. This capacity for thinking about thoughts – or ToM – involves the ability to 
metarepresent, i.e., to represent representations as representations (Perner, 1991).  EM 
retrieval involves the explicit understanding that what is being brought to mind is a
mental representation of a past experience. The memory is identified as a memory.  
Without metarepresentation there is no awareness of the propositional attitude (e.g. ‘I
remember that’) assumed in relation to the information held in mind. It is
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metarepresentation that underlies the distinction between noetic and autonoetic
awareness. Thus, without metarepresentation, memories would involve (semantic)
knowing rather than (episodic) remembering as shown below in (i) and (ii) respectively.
(i) I went to the shop and bought milk.
(ii) [I remember that] I went to the shop and bought milk
A number of authors have argued for the role of metarepresentation in EM development
(Perner & Ruffman, 1995; Perner, 2000; Perner, 2001; Welch-Ross, 1995; Welch-Ross,
2001; Nelson & Fivush, 2004). Temporally extended self-awareness may also rely upon 
metarepresentation because it involves understanding present, past and possible future
self-representations as (alternative) representations of the same temporally extended 
coherent self (Povinelli, 1995; Povinelli & Simon, 1998; Perner, 2001).
3. The Development of Temporal Cognition
Certain developments in temporal cognition are also thought to be prerequisites of EM
because, unlike semantic memories, episodic memories involve explicitly thinking about 
the past. More specifically, EM involves representing remembered events as specific past 
events that occurred at particular times (McCormack & Hoerl, 2001).  For this, events 
need to be understood as unique and unrepeatable. This clearly distinguishes episodic 
memories from the generalised script-like memories that dominate in early childhood.  
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McCormack and Hoerl (2001) suggest that EM relies on ‘temporal perspective
taking’ abilities, which, in turn, rely upon having a concept of time that incorporates both 
‘nonperspectival’ and ‘perspectival’ temporal frameworks. According to their theory, 
nonperspectival temporal frameworks are conceptual structures that represent the 
relationships between events located at different points in time, whereas perspectival
temporal frameworks represent the temporal location of events in relation to one’s own
temporal location. Infants of less than 1;0 year can imitate novel event sequences in the
correct order (Bauer, 1997), thereby showing that they represent the temporal order of
event sequences – they have a non-perspectival temporal framework. That children
comprehend and use tense correctly to describe past and anticipated future events by the
time they are 2;6 years old (e.g., Weist, 1989) suggests that by this age they have at least 
a rudimentary perspectival temporal framework. It is not, however, until around 4;0 years 
of age that children can engage in the kind of temporal perspective taking that
McCormack and Hoerl argue is fundamental to EM. That is, the ability to imagine events 
and their relations to each other from a different temporal perspective whilst monitoring 
the relation between one’s present temporal point of view and the one generated in 
imagination or recalled from memory. This is only possible once metarepresentational 
ability has developed, because it crucially depends upon understanding that one’s current 
perspective is just one of many possible perspectives.  One must not only occupy (in 
imagination) different temporal perspectives but also explicitly conceive of them as 
temporal perspectives.  
Autonoetic remembering also seems to require an understanding of temporal-
causal relationships. Although fairly young children have a basic understanding of
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causality (e.g., Bullock & Gelman, 1979), it is not until around 4;0 years of age that they 
realise that more recently occurring events are likely to bear a more direct causal relation 
to present circumstances than events located in the more distant past (Povinelli et al., 
1999). Povinelli et al. (1999) suggest that 3;0 year olds have difficulty comprehending 
the ‘causal arrow of time’ – i.e., conceiving of time as a sequence of chronologically 
ordered, causally related episodes – and that this may be related to changes in self-
concept. Indeed, children’s ability to make temporal-causal inferences dramatically 
improves between the ages of 3;0 and 5;0 years (McCormack & Hoerl, 2005). Povinelli 
and colleagues suggest that, without an appreciation of the causal arrow of time as well as 
a capacity for metarepresentation, a child cannot understand the causal relation between 
present, past and future states of self, and thus cannot entertain a temporally-extended 
representation of self or experience autonoetic consciousness.
How Might Diminished Episodic Memory in Autism Be Explained?
We now return to the question of why EM is attenuated in people with ASDs. Evidence
relating to the development of self-awareness, representational ability and temporal
cognition in autism is reviewed, building on material presented in the three main sections 
of the first part of the chapter. From our review of the evidence, it is concluded that 
impairments across all three prerequisites for EM contribute to impaired autonoetic
consciousness and hence impaired EM in autism.
This chapter is published in a revised form in J. Boucher & D. Bowler (Eds.). Memory in Autism: 
Theory and Evidence.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. © J. Boucher & D. Bowler 2008.
16
1. Impaired self-awareness in people with autism?
The ecological and interpersonal self.
Russell (1996) has suggested that autism involves impairments in self-awareness at the
most primitive – ecological – level, hypothesising a fundamental impairment in self-
monitoring and, hence, an impaired sense of agency. However, studies have shown that
children with ASDs do have awareness of their own agency in the physical/ecological
domain. Russell and Hill (2001) and Williams and Happé (in preparation), for example,
found that children with autism were capable of identifying which of a number of moving 
dots displayed on a computer screen, one of which they were able to move with the 
computer’s mouse, was under their control. More generally, individuals with ASDs (who 
do not have co-morbid diagnoses of dyspraxia) have few difficulties in engaging with the 
physical world, suggesting they are aware of their bodies in relation to the physical 
environment and that ecological self-awareness is largely intact.  
By contrast, individuals with ASDs appear to be less aware of themselves in
relation to other people. Many characteristics of autism suggest that interpersonal self-
awareness is severely impaired (e.g., Neisser, 1988; Hobson, 1990, 1993; Loveland,
1993; Tomasello, 1995). In typical development, interpersonal self-awareness is obtained 
through early social interaction, imitation, turn-taking and so on. However, because 
social interaction among children with ASDs is so impoverished, they cannot acquire the 
usual wealth of self-relevant information available through such experiences. Some 
children with autism show indifference to other people, treating them as objects rather 
than as beings with whom one can meaningfully and contingently interact. Even in less 
This chapter is published in a revised form in J. Boucher & D. Bowler (Eds.). Memory in Autism: 
Theory and Evidence.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. © J. Boucher & D. Bowler 2008.
17
severe cases, interactions tend to be stereotyped and lacking in reciprocity (DSM-IV, 
American Psychiatric Association, 1994). The difficulty may be with monitoring self in 
relation to other in order to coordinate action. Perhaps a specific problem of 
‘interpersonal agency’?
The conceptual self.
There is clear evidence that children with autism do develop an explicit concept of self,
albeit one that is somewhat developmentally delayed. What is striking, however, about
the self-concepts of these children is their markedly atypical quality. Given that early
implicit self-awareness is thought to serve as a foundation for later explicit forms of self-
awareness, it is no surprise that interpersonally, but not ecologically, grounded
components of explicit self-awareness are impaired in autism. So, for example, MSR is
relatively intact, whereas self-conscious emotion, pronoun use, and beliefs about the self 
are all atypical, as outlined below. Children with autism are capable of mirror self-
recognition at the appropriate mental age (Ferrari & Matthews, 1983, Spiker & Ricks,
1984; Neuman & Hill, 1978; Dawson & McKissick, 1984). However, successful
performance on the task is not evidence of intact conceptual self-awareness. It merely
suggests that these individuals have conceptual self-knowledge of their typical facial
appearance – they have mental representations of what they look like. It is worth noting
here that the fact that MSR is relatively unimpaired in children with autism, whereas EM 
is impaired, weakens Howe and Courage’s (1993) claim that MSR marks the critical 
cognitive change underlying EM.  
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The interpersonally grounded component of conceptual self-awareness has been
explored in studies of children’s conscious awareness of themselves in social situations.  
In particular, the experience of self-conscious emotion is clearly interpersonally
grounded. Factors such as personal responsibility, normative standards, and the role of an 
audience, have been identified as important for the experience of these emotions (Capps, 
Yirmiya, & Sigman, 1992). None of the MSR studies carried out with children with 
ASDs reported the kind of self-conscious affective reactions that occur among typically 
developing children in this test. More generally, it seems that individuals with autism are 
less likely to spontaneously experience these emotions (see Faran & Ben Shalom, 
Chapter 5). They do not show the characteristic changes in facial expression, posture or 
gestures that are associated with these emotional states (Kasari, Chamberlain, & 
Bauminger, 2001). For example, although they experience pleasure, they are less likely to 
experience pride, in response to a personal achievement (Kasari, Sigman, Baumgartner, 
& Stipek, 1993). It is possible, however, that the problem here lies not with conceptual 
self-awareness but, rather, with lack of awareness of the presence of others or lack of 
awareness of social standards. It has also been reported that they are less likely to 
empathise with others (Sigman, Kasari, Kwon, & Yirmiya, 1992). This is important 
because the capacity for empathy entails an understanding that self is like other, whilst 
also representing self and other as distinct individuals. Reduced empathising capacity 
may, therefore, reflect an impaired concept of self, at least at an emotional level.  
There is also an autism-specific deficit in another of the established behavioural
markers of conceptual self-awareness: personal pronoun use. Since Kanner’s (1943)
seminal paper, it has been widely acknowledged that individuals with autism tend to have 
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difficulty using personal pronouns such as ‘I’, ‘you’ and ‘me’. In young children with 
autism, pronoun reversal errors are relatively common (Tager-Flusberg, 1989; Lee,
Hobson & Chiat, 1994). Indeed, the problem exists over and above any general language 
impairment, and is so prevalent that it is used as a diagnostic criterion for autism (Le 
Couteur, Lord, & Rutter, 2003). Typical patterns of difficulty include treating pronouns 
as if they were proper names attached to a fixed referent - saying, for  example, “You 
want a drink” in order to request a drink for themselves. Other characteristic difficulties 
include substituting third person pronouns such as ‘he’ or ‘she’ or proper names for first 
person pronouns (Jordan, 1989). Using third person labels in this way circumvents the 
problem of shifting referents involved in pronoun use.  Appropriate pronoun use is 
clearly an interpersonally grounded facet of conceptual self-awareness, since it requires 
an understanding of self in relation to others.  
Lee and Hobson (1998) assessed conceptual self-knowledge using Damon and  
Hart’s (1988) self-understanding interview to compare the beliefs about the self of a
group of children and adolescents with autism to those of a matched comparison group.  
Their results fit the emerging pattern, in that ecologically grounded conceptual self-
knowledge was intact but interpersonally grounded conceptual self-knowledge was
impaired. Specifically, participants with autism produced significantly more, but
qualitatively similar, descriptions of their physical and active characteristics, relative to
the comparison group. Self-descriptive statements of psychological and social
characteristics, on the other hand, differed qualitatively from those of comparison
children and, in the latter instance, quantitatively, in that they produced significantly
fewer descriptions that fell into the social category.
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The private self.
Autism clearly entails a serious impairment in private self-awareness. This may be
regarded as a specific manifestation of the ToM impairment associated with autism.  
Individuals with ASDs have difficulty not only with understanding others’ mental states
but also with understanding their own. For example, children with autism have equal
difficulty attributing knowledge or ignorance to self or other depending upon whether
that person has had informational access to that knowledge (e.g., though seeing or being
told about a piece of information) (Perner, Frith, Leslie, & Leekam, 1989; Kazak, Collis, 
& Lewis, 1997). Furthermore, they find it difficult to distinguish their own intended from 
unintended actions. In particular, when their unintended actions have a desirable outcome 
they show a tendency to claim that their action was, in fact, deliberate (Philips, Baron-
Cohen, & Rutter, 1998; however, Russell & Hill, 2001, failed to replicate this finding). 
This suggests an impairment of introspective awareness – difficulty with conceptualising 
their own mental processes.  
These problems appear to extend to the emotional domain also. Again, individuals 
with autism are not only impaired in identifying emotions in others but also in processing 
their own emotional states. In a recent study, Hill, Berthoz, and Frith (2004) asked adult 
participants to complete a questionnaire assessing own emotion processing. They found 
that, compared to a typically developing comparison group, participants with high-
functioning autism reported greater difficulties in identifying and describing their feelings 
and showed a greater propensity for externally oriented thinking. Similarly, Ben Shalom 
et al. (2006) reported that children with ASDs showed normal physiological emotional 
reactions, as measured by galvanic skin response, but impaired ability to report these 
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emotions. Thus, impaired private self-awareness is evident in adults as well as children 
with ASDs.  
Frith and Happé (1999) suggest that those high-functioning individuals who do
develop some introspective awareness (many individuals produce elaborate
autobiographical accounts) have done so through a “slow and painstaking learning
process” (Frith & Happé, 1999, p.2), developing a qualitatively different kind of self-
consciousness.  In a study of three adults with Asperger syndrome, Hurlburt, Happé, and 
Frith (1994) did, indeed, find that self-reported inner experiences differed markedly from 
those reported by typically developing individuals. Specifically, participants with
Asperger syndrome reported thoughts that were concrete and factually based comprising
mainly visual images. Most intriguingly, they did not report any form of inner speech and 
tended not to report emotions or bodily sensations. This suggests that private 
selfawareness, like conceptual self-awareness, is qualitatively different in individuals 
with ASDs.
The temporally extended self.
In a recent study of delayed self-recognition, Lind and Bowler (in preparation) found that 
children with ASDs tended to remove the sticker only when asked explicitly to do so. By 
contrast, comparison children tended to remove the sticker without direct prompting. 
These results are suggestive of impaired temporally extended self-awareness.  There is 
also indirect evidence of such an impairment. Young typically developing children who 
fail DSR, tend to label past self-images such as photographs and video recordings using 
their own name, rather than saying ‘me’ (Povinelli, Landau, & Perilloux, 1996). Taking a 
This chapter is published in a revised form in J. Boucher & D. Bowler (Eds.). Memory in Autism: 
Theory and Evidence.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. © J. Boucher & D. Bowler 2008.
22
third person stance, by using a proper name, may well indicate an inability to identify 
with the depicted image (past self-representation), which would require a sense of 
personal continuity through time. Indeed, it is at least possible that those children who 
labelled the image using their proper name were not recognising the videos/photographs 
as themselves but, rather, showing a simple learned association between ‘that face’ and 
‘that name’. Lind and Bowler (in preparation) found that participants with ASD were 
significantly more likely than comparison participants to label their own video image 
using their proper name. Lee, Hobson and Chiat (1994) also found that, in contrast to 
comparison children, even fairly verbally able children with autism showed this same 
propensity to use proper names in a photograph naming task. This observation is 
suggestive of an impairment, or delay in the development of, a temporally extended self 
in children with autism.
To summarise, let us once again consider how Neisser’s (1988) five kinds of self-
awareness, as described in the section on the development of self in typical children, 
manifest themselves in people with autism. The evidence reviewed earlier in the chapter 
suggests that although ecological self-awareness is probably intact, interpersonal self-
awareness is not. Conceptual self-awareness is also atypical, as is evident from, amongst 
other things, abnormal pronoun use, self-conscious emotion and the formation of beliefs 
about the self that have social connotations. If autonoetic consciousness depends upon 
explicit self-awareness, it can be inferred that anything that disrupts this development 
may potentially impact upon EM. Impairments in conceptual, private and temporally 
extended self-awareness are likely to contribute directly to the EM impairment in autism. 
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Impairments in interpersonal self-awareness may have indirect effects through altering 
the development of explicit self-awareness.
The claim that impaired sense of self contributes to EM impairments in autism is
consistent with the fact that individuals with ASDs have particular difficulties when
memory tasks demand a high degree of self-involvement (e.g., Russell & Jarrold, 1999;
Millward, Powell, Messer, & Jordan, 2000; see also Toichi, Chapter 8). However, it is
clear that EM depends upon more than self-awareness. As explained above it requires
certain (related) representational and temporal-cognitive skills. This is discussed below.
2. Impaired representational abilities?
The same underlying difficulty in ToM/metarepresentation that leads to impairments in
private self-awareness is also likely to impact upon the capacity of people with ASDs to
experience autonoetic consciousness. Consequently, much of the evidence reported in the 
section on private self-awareness in autism is relevant here. Impaired performance on 
ToM tasks is usually interpreted as the result of difficulty with metarepresentation – with 
conceptualising mental states. Metarepresentational problems would mean that
individuals with autism would not be aware of their own propositional attitudes to the
information in their own minds. Thus, memories could not be identified as memories and, 
therefore, could not be consciously reflected upon as memories. This might explain why 
recall in autism seems to be dominated by knowing rather than remembering (Bowler et 
al., 2000, 2007).
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3. An impairment of temporal cognition?
As mentioned above, mental time travel requires past or future oriented thinking.  
Problems with these forms of cognition may well contribute to the observed impairments. 
Both clinical and anecdotal accounts suggest that people with autism have a “poor 
intuitive sense of time” (Boucher, 2001, p.111). It is notable, also, that cognitive 
problems in autism include difficulty in both thinking backwards (episodic remembering) 
and thinking forwards (planning) though time (e.g., Bowler, Gardiner, & Grice, 2000; 
Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1991).
Very little work directly assessing temporal cognition in autism has been reported. 
Recently, however, Boucher, Pons, Lind & Williams (2007) found that children and 
adolescents with ASDs were impaired relative to a matched comparison group on a 
number of tests designed to assess the ability to use temporal concepts in thinking and 
reasoning. Of particular note was the fact that the experimental group had significantly 
more difficulties with both past and future oriented thinking. So, for example, one of the 
tests involved presenting the children with a picture of a seaside scene and asking them to 
describe what was happening. Participants with autism were less likely to describe 
possible antecedents or consequents of the currently depicted state of affairs. Unlike 
comparison children, who produced descriptions such as “That man's lying on the mat –
he'll get sunburned if he's not careful”, children with autism tended to describe the scene 
primarily in terms of the present moment, producing descriptions such as “There's a 
person surfing. And someone sunbathing”. These problems with past and future oriented 
thinking were not related to performance on a battery of tests of theory of mind 
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suggesting that difficulties with temporal cognition – particularly the ability to make 
temporal-causal inferences – could contribute to EM impairments independently of 
difficulties associated with impaired metarepresentation.  What we do not yet know, 
however, is whether individuals with autism can form and coordinate perspectival and 
non-perspectival temporal frameworks. If this ability were to be impaired then it may 
well contribute to EM impairments.
Summary
Experimental evidence shows that individuals with autism have diminished EM and the
self-involved, time-related experiences of autonoetic awareness that accompany this kind 
of remembering. The aim of this chapter was to establish the cause, or causes, of this 
impairment. There are a number of possible explanations, as is evident from a review of 
the prerequisites for the development of EM in typically developing children. These 
include the normal development of self-awareness. It has been claimed, for example, that 
the development of a self-concept indexed by successful mirror self-recognition is the 
critical prerequisite for EM. Related to the development of self are changes in 
representational abilities, from primary to secondary representations, to
metarepresentation. A third prerequisite for the development EM is an ability to think and 
reason about time. Impaired metarepresentation is often considered to offer a sufficient 
explanation of impaired EM in autism. Whilst accepting that diminished ability to 
conceive of one's own mental states could impact on EM in various ways, an explanation 
in terms of impaired metarepresentational ability may be too strong in view of the 
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evidence that there is some residual self-awareness in relation to memory in this
population. Moreover, there is some evidence of impaired temporal cognition in people
with ASDs, occurring independently of any impairment of metarepresentational abilities. 
Impaired temporal cognition is consistent with our suggestion that people with ASDs 
have an impoverished concept of the temporally extended self. We also present evidence 
that the development of self is abnormal in people with autism at the foundational stage 
of an implicit interpersonal self, and argue that this has secondary effects on the 
acquisition of an explicit self-concept. What remains to be explained is how evolving 
conceptions of self and of events strung out in time are related, and how they interact 
with other areas of psychological functioning.
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